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ABSTRACT

During the past century, conceptualizing mental disorders has fluctuated between
biomedical and psychosocial models of psychopathology. By theorizing the
nature of psychopathology, the social constructivist and essentialist perspectives
each explain these fluctuations in understanding mental disorders. According to
the social constructivist perspective, mental disorders are abstract ideas, which are
defined by the sociocultural values of the time. Conversely, the essentialist
perspective maintains that mental disorders are discrete, naturally occurring
entities with a biological basis. Extant research suggests that essentialist beliefs
may underlie lay conceptions of mental disorders (Haslam & Ernst, 2005). The
present study investigated how lay preconceived notions about mental disorders
influenced inferences about the nature and treatment of various mental disorders.
394 undergraduates read diagnostic vignettes for mental disorders and reported
their beliefs on dimensions of essentialism, global functioning, and treatment. In
addition, participants reported the degree to which they intuitively adhered to a
biomedical or psychosocial model of mental disorders. Results indicated that
laypeople conceptualize mental disorders into three broad clusters. Laypeople
believed that Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal
Personality Disorder were biologically-oriented and categorical in nature. On the
other hand, laypeople believed that Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder were influenced by psychosocial factors and that
they were dimensional in nature. Interestingly, laypeople conceptualized Major
Depressive Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder as having both a biological and
psychosocial basis. Moreover, results indicated that laypeople who adhere to a
biomedical model, psychosocial model, or biomedical-psychosocial dialectic
model of mental disorders conceptualize clusters of mental disorders differently.
Findings suggest that attribution models of mental disorders frame laypeople’s
beliefs and intuitions about mental disorders.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS.....................................................................v
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................1
METHOD................................................................................................16
RESULTS...............................................................................................21
DISCUSSION........................................................................................ 31
REFERENCES.......................................................................................39
APPENDICES........................................................................................43
TABLES................................................................................................. 58
FIGURE

69

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to thank Professor Glenn Shean, who has been a patient mentor
and critic throughout work on this thesis. Credit is also due to Professors Larry
Ventis and Rick Frieden for their helpful suggestions and careful reading of the
manuscript.

1

Folk Conceptions of Mental Disorders
“Men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would amount to another form
o f madness. ” ~ Blaise Pascal
What is a mental disorder? Although the definition of psychopathology
has fluctuated through the centuries (for review, see Alexander & Selesnick,
1995), its definition has tried to identify the line which divides normal human
behavior from the psychological dysfunction of mental disorders. The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) currently
defines mental disorders as “clinically significant behavioral or psychological
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with
present distress or disability or with a significantly increased risk of suffering
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom” (p. xxxi). Unfortunately,
the DSM-IV-TR definition of mental disorders does not pinpoint exactly what a
mental disorder is. After all, how does one distinguish “clinically significant
behavior” from “not clinically significant” behavior? Moreover, is the
determination of “clinically significant behavior” reserved exclusively for
psychiatrists and other mental health care professionals?
Indeed, the DSM-IV-TR definition of mental disorders is ambiguous, and
as a result, it fails to label the defining properties of mental disorders. Regardless,
this definition contains the two core components o f prototypical definitions of
mental disorders: scientific and value judgments. According to the theory of
harmful dysfunction for conceptualizing mental disorders, mental disorder
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attributions require both a scientific judgment that there exists a failure of
designed function and a value judgment that design failure harms the individual
(Wakefield, 1992, 1999). In a two-pronged manner, Wakefield’s (1992, 1999)
definition of mental disorders recognizes that biological criteria are essential
components of defining mental disorders. That is, mental disorders arise from a
biological “failure,” which is identified and evaluated according to scientific
judgment. Secondly, Wakefield’s (1992, 1999) definition concedes that
sociocultural criteria are likewise an important component of defining mental
disorders. Without the value judgment of assaying mental disorder-induced
“harmful” outcomes for the individual, mental disorders would not exist. Hence,
the definition of mental disorders must simultaneously address universal
biological criteria and relative sociocultural criteria.
From prehistoric times to the modem era, the definition, latent features,
and names of mental disorders have fluctuated. These changes in the historical
conceptions of mental disorders can be attributed to evolving understanding of the
biological functioning of humans and dynamic sociocultural trends. Cumulatively,
the advancement of medicine and changing cultural values regarding
psychopathology have conceded shifts in thinking about mental disorders. Before
the modem era of science in the late 19 century, the conception of mental
disorders was relatively stable and widely held, for it fluctuated over spans of
centuries. However, the last 150 years of psychiatry has been demarcated by
radical transitions in the conception of mental disorders which occurred in the
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span of decades. Moreover, mental health professionals embroiled in a debate on
the nature of psychopathology have often espoused widely divergent views on
mental disorders. To illustrate these changing trends in modem psychiatric
thought, we will provide a brief survey of historical conceptions of mental
disorders.
Historical Conceptions o f Mental Disorders
Medical Model o f the Modern Era. During the late 19 century,
psychiatry became a branch of medicine and mental disorders were
conceptualized as biologically-based diseases (for review, see Alexander &
Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002). The medical model for understanding mental
disorders was developed by psychiatrist Emil Kaepelin, the founder of modem
scientific psychiatry. Kraepelin believed that all mental disorders were biological
disturbances with the brain. The behavior, cognitions, and affect of an individual
with mental illness were merely symptoms of this brain-based disease. From this
medical model, Kraepelin observed the “symptoms” of mental disorders to
classify and diagnose various brain-based diseases (i.e., mental disorders), which
parallels physicians observing the physiological symptoms of a patient to
diagnose a disease. Through this scientific system of observation o f symptoms
and diagnosis, Kraepelin was able to differentiate manic depression from
dementia praecox (i.e., schizophrenia). The realm of psychiatry was still limited
to select cases of severe psychosis, and these individuals were institutionalized in
asylums. For instance, Kraepelin limited his diagnostic system to dementia
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praecox, manic depression, and severe depression. People with everyday
problems sought clergical guidance, and they were not considered to have a
mental disorder.
Psychoanalytic M odel Throughout the early to mid twentieth century,
psychoanalytic model of mental disorders reigned over psychiatry (for review, see
Alexander & Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002; Valenstein, 1998). “In 1950, it was
rare that someone not committed to psychoanalytic theory would head a major
psychiatry department” (Valenstein, 1998, p. 1). Instead of conceptualizing
mental disorders as a brain-based disease, psychiatry interpreted mental disorders
according to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Mental disorders were
attributed to early childhood experiences. In particular, one’s relationship with
one’s mother was emphasized, and the quality of that relationship strongly
influenced the presence of mental illness later in life. Moreover, mental disorders
were caused by repression, sexual desires, fixations, or one’s libido. In addition,
the legacy of Freud demystified and humanized mental disorders. Mental
disorders were no longer limited to the madmen warehoused in Bedlam (Bethlem
Royal Hospital in London). Mental disorders now extended to all people coping
with everyday problems of living. As such, treatment for mental disorders
became a process of self exploration. Intellectuals, artists, bohemians, teachers,
health professionals, and those that frequented museums or concerts comprised
the clientele base of psychoanalytic psychiatry. These individuals often were
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naturally inclined toward introspection and a strong individual identity and were
marginalized by mainstream society.
Antipsychiatry & Deinstitutionalization. From 1950 to 1970, the history
psychiatry was punctuated by antipsychiatry and deinstitutionalization (for review,
see Alexander & Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002; Valenstein, 1998). These two
events radically shifted the conception of mental disorders by countering the
psychoanalytic model and restoring the medical model. Antipsychiatric writings,
such as Szasz’s (1960) The Myth o f Mental Illness, challenged the very existence
of mental disorders. Antipsychiatry, although a short-lived movement, had
lasting repercussions for psychiatry. It exposed that yesterday’s socially deviant
behavior could become today’s mental disorder.
Occurring simultaneously with the antipsychiatry movement,
advancements in psychopharmaceuticals revolutionized the treatment of mental
disorders. Compared to psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy was immediately
effective and less time consuming. As a result, psychiatrists began using
pharmacotherapy to treat patients at mental hospitals. Due to the efficacy of
pharmacotherapy, thousands of mentally ill individuals were deinstitutionalized,
or released from mental hospitals. The dramatic impact of pharmacotherapy on
psychiatry is most evident between 1950 and 1970. In 1950, it was considered
unethical to conduct schizophrenia research without psychotherapy, yet by 1970,
it was considered unethical to conduct this research without pharmacotherapy
(Gunderson, 1977).
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Biomedical Model Since antipsychiatry and deinstitutionalization, the
conception of mental disorders has returned to the neo-Kraepelin biomedical
model (for review, see Alexander & Selesnick, 1995; Horwitz, 2002). Modem
psychiatry has shifted from blaming the mother for mental disorders to blaming
the brain (Valenstein, 1998). According to the biomedical model, people with
mental disorders “suffer from a sick or broken brain, not from weak will, laziness,
bad character, or bad upbringing” (Andreasen, 1984, p.8). For many health care
professionals, mental disorders are considered to be brain-based, biological
dysfunctions and chemical imbalances, which result in disturbances in cognition,
affect, and behavior. Like physiological diseases, mental disorders are diagnosed
by a medical professional observing a pattern of symptoms and prognosticated
with psychopharmaceuticals. Despite the similarities, the medical model of
Kraepelin’s era and the current biomedical model differ in two important ways.
For one, the current biomedical model posits that since mental disorders are brainbased dysfunctions, mental disorders can be treated and potentially reversed, or
“cured,” with psychopharmaceuticals. Secondly, the current biomedical model
extends mental disorders to problems of living, whereas Kraepelin’s medical
model restricted mental disorders to select cases of severe psychosis.
Conclusion. This historical survey of the conception of mental disorders
demonstrates that thinking about psychopathology has come full circle, from
Kraepelin’s medical model to the Freudian psychoanalytic model to the neoKraepelin biomedical model.
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Conceptualizing Mental Disorders
These radical transformations in thinking about mental disorders illustrate
broader sociocultural fluctuations in defining and conceptualizing mental
disorders. Over the past century, defining mental disorders has swung between
Wakefield’s (1992, 1999) two-pronged criteria. Specifically, defining mental
disorders has oscillated between emphasizing scientific values with the
biomedical model and emphasizing sociocultural values with the psychosocial
model. This fluctuation reflects a transition between two perspectives of
conceptualizing and understanding mental disorders - social constructivism and
essentialism.
According to the social constructivist perspective, mental disorders are
abstract ideas that are socially constructed, instead of scientifically constructed
(Maddux, Gosselin, & Winstead, 2005). Mental disorders are not universal and
stable across time. In fact, social constructivism asserts that mental disorders are
defined by the sociocultural values of the time. Accordingly, since the definitions
of mental disorders fluctuate, psychopathology has a dimensional nature, in that
people merely vary by the extent to which they express psychological phenomena,
such as emotion, mood, intelligence, and behavior. The psychoanalytic model of
mental disorders is closely analogous to the social constructivist perspective, for it
redefined psychopathology in a unique manner that suited the philosophical
th

climate of the time. For instance, during the early 20 century, Freudian theory
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allowed for broadening the definition of mental disorders to include common
problems of living.
Conversely, the essentialist perspective maintains that mental disorders are
discrete, naturally occurring entities with a biological basis (Haslam, 2005;
Rosenblum & Travis, 1996). In addition, mental disorders can be discovered and
studied scientifically. As such, essentialism asserts that mental disorders have a
biological essence, which makes them universal and immutable, or stable across
historical epochs. According to this perspective, any fluctuation in thinking about
psychopathology would be propelled by advancements in scientific understanding.
The essentialist perspective asserts that mental disorders are biologically-oriented,
discrete entities, and that their classification has a categorical nature. Not
surprisingly, the biomedical model of mental disorders and the current diagnostic
system of the DSM-IV-TR are closely analogous to the essentialist perspective.
Throughout the radical transformations in popular thought on
psychopathology, mental health professionals have espoused the social
constructivist and essentialist perspectives simultaneously. These divergent
perspectives on the nature of psychopathology have historically have pitted the
biological and psychosocial origins of mental disorders against each other. In its
historical context, this debate is known as the “Nature versus Nurture” debate.
Proponents of the “Nature” argument traditionally supported a model of genetic
inheritence o f mental disorders. On the other hand, proponents of the “Nurture”
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argument traditionally supported the importance of life experiences in the
development of mental disorders.
Despite compelling empirical evidence for both “Nature” and “Nurture”
arguments, the conflicting views on origin of mental disorders are, unfortunately,
not merging into a grand synthesis of the two (Valenstein, 1998). Indeed,
genetics can influence one’s interactions with the environment, just as interactions
with the environment can influence genetic expression. Regardless of the
interplay between genes and the environment, a multitude of factors, such as
publishing opportunities, empirical methodology trends, funding for research
grants, aggressive advertising from psychopharmaceutical companies, and third
party supported treatment options for mental disorders, indicate that the
biomedical model of mental disorders dominates current professional and public
thinking about mental disorders (Luhrmann, 2000).
Lay Beliefs about Mental Disorders
Unlike mental health professionals, the general public is less likely to have
been inculcated with the biomedical model of mental disorders from
psychological training or from reading empirical studies and other psychological
writings. Realistically, the public has probably received most of its information
on the biomedical model of mental disorders from the advertising campaigns of
mental disorder advocacy groups and psychopharmaceutical companies.
Psychopharmaceutical companies are a multibillion dollar industry. Similar to all
companies, their economic viability is dependent upon the retention of current
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clients and the recruitment of new clients. As a result, the marketing campaigns
of psychopharmaceutical campaigns promote the biomedical model of mental
disorders. By increasing public opinion that psychopharmaceuticals effectively
treat mental disorders, the psychopharmaceutical companies, in effect, increase
their clientele base and profit margin. Furthermore, in adherence with the
biomedical model, psychopharmaceutical companies advertise that mental
disorders are biologically-based, disease-like entities. For instance, Eli Lilly
advertised for Prozac, which is a popular drug treatment for depression, “Like
diabetes or arthritis, depression is a physical illness” (cited in, Valenstein, 1998, p.
181). Hence, lay conceptions of mental disorders and their knowledge of the
biomedical model of mental disorders are shaped by psychopharmaceutical
companies.
Laypeople’s conceptions of mental disorders could resemble diluted
reflections of professional views on mental disorders (Jorm, 2000). Conversely,
laypeople could actively construct their own understandings of mental disorders
based on broader sociocultural views (Haslam, 2005). Regardless o f how
laypeople conceptualize mental disorders, it is likely that current lay conceptions
o f mental disorders are, at least loosely, based on the biomedical model of mental
disorders. According to Haslam (2000), the biomedical model is characterized by
four tenets: 1) mental disorders are caused by abnormalities of biological
structures, 2) each mental disorder has a specific, brain-based etiology, 3) mental
disorders are real, categorically distinct entities which can be diagnosed, and 4)
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mental disorders are historically and panculturally universal. If the biomedical
model of mental disorders shapes public opinion, it is unclear just how stringently
laypeople adhere to Haslam’s (2000) “pure” biomedical model. Similarly, the
extent to which the biomedical model filters lay conceptions of mental disorders
is unclear.
Evidence that laypeople hold a biomedical model of mental disorders is
partially supported by extant research on essentialist beliefs about mental
disorders. People tend to essentialize, that is attribute an underlying essence, to
naturally occurring social categories. That is, people can construct social
categories, such as ethnic or sexual orientation categories, according to these
biological essences (Hirschfeld, 1995; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Since the
biomedical model of mental disorders maintains that each mental disorder is
universal and has a biologically-based etiology with discrete categories (Haslam,
2000), it follows that laypeople with a biomedical model would view mental
disorders as real, disease-like entities with essences (Haslam & Ernst, 2002;
Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Kendell, 1986).
Haslam and Ernst (2005) examined essentialist beliefs about mental
disorders. Using a college sample, they presented a vignette describing the
diagnostic criteria of a mental disorder and a debate on its origin for bulimia
nervosa, hypochondriasis, major depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder and
schizophrenia. Following each vignette and its accompanying etiology debate,
participants responded to the Essentialist Beliefs Scale (Haslam et al., 2000, 2002),

which assesses 8 dimensions of an essentialist perspective: informativeness,
historical invariance, discreteness, uniformity, immutability, necessary features,
inherence, and naturalness. They found that participants tend to view most as
natural kinds, meaning that they are discrete, immutable, and natural. However,
their findings did not support the notion that mental disorders are entitative, for
laypeople believed that the mental disorder diagnosis did not convey much
information and that people with this disorder were not similar to one another).
Hence, Haslam and Ernst (2005) found partial support that laypeople maintain
essentialist beliefs about mental disorders.
In general, the direct link between essentialist beliefs about mental
disorders and the biomedical model is better supported by theory than empirical
research. Research suggests that essentialist beliefs may only loosely guide
conceptions of mental disorders (Haslam & Ernst, 2005; Haslam, Rothschild, &
Ernst, 2000). For example, Haslam and Ernst (2005) found that laypeople only
endorsed the natural kinds dimension of essentialist beliefs, not the entitative
dimension. Moreover, both mental health professionals and laypeople
essentialize mental disorders less than medical disorders, such as allergies, high
blood pressure, or chickenpox (Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh, & Sanislow, 2006). These
findings suggest that laypeople may conceptualize mental disorders as disease
like, but it is unlikely that laypeople strictly view mental disorders as biological,
brain-based disease entities.
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In fact, research suggests that laypeople may differentially apply models
of mental disorders. Specifically, laypeople may attribute different causes and
suggest different treatments depending on the mental disorder and whether the
diagnosis is provided. For instance, Schomerus, Matschinger, and Angermeyer
(2006) found that laypeople were more likely to attribute biological causes, such
as brain disease and heredity, to schizophrenia, whereas they were more likely to
attribute psychosocial causes, such as drug abuse and stress, to depression.
Moreover, a cross-cultural review of research over the last 15 years on lay beliefs
about mental illness echoed similar findings (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006).
According to their review (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006), most studies on the lay
beliefs of mental disorders are descriptive in nature, and they use a vignette
empirical paradigm. In addition, a substantial proportion of the public cannot
recognize specific mental disorders well. When presented with a vignette without
a diagnosis, laypeople worldwide tended to use a psychosocial model for
understanding mental disorders, and they recommended psychological
interventions for treatment. However, when laypeople were presented with both a
vignette and a diagnosis, laypeople tended to use a psychosocial model for
conceptualizing depression, but they used a biomedical model for conceptualizing
schizophrenia.
Angermeyer’s and Dietrich’s (2006) cross-cultural review reveals several
limitations of research on lay beliefs of mental disorders. For one, the findings
are not easily generalizable to American folk conceptions o f mental disorders.
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Although some research came from America, Angermeyer and Dietrich (2006)
primarily reviewed European research on lay beliefs. The American public may
view mental disorder etiology and treatment different from Europeans, as they
may have differential exposure to psychopharmaceutical advertising and different
cultural views on mental disorders. Secondly, research on lay beliefs o f mental
disorders has disproportionately focused on depression and schizophrenia. This
indicates that various other mental disorders need to be examined in order to
investigate folk conceptions of mental disorders, in general. Finally, extant
research on lay beliefs of mental disorders is primarily descriptive, instead of
theory driven. As a result, it is difficult to ascertain how laypeople use models of
mental disorders when they conceptualize mental disorders.
Present Study
The purpose of the present study is to explore lay conceptions of various
mental disorders. Extant attitudinal research on population beliefs about mental
disorders has focused on European samples, the mental disorders schizophrenia
and depression, and describing public opinion (for review, see Angermeyer &
Dietrich, 2006). The present study will examine American lay conceptions of
mental disorders. In addition, it will not only investigate lay views on depression
and schizophrenia, but it will also include less frequently studied mental disorders,
such as Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, Bipolar I Disorder, Dysthymic
Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder.
Furthermore, the present study will examine the aforementioned mental disorders
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in an exploratory manner in order to generate a theory of lay conceptions of
mental disorders. Finally, the present study will investigate how lay preconceived
biases on the etiology of mental disorders influences beliefs about the nature and
treatment of various mental disorders.
The methodology of the present study will be loosely based on Haslam’s
and Ernst’s (2005) empirical paradigm for essentialist beliefs on mental disorders.
The present study will administer a web-based, anonymous survey to a population
of young adults, who are currently enrolled in a collegiate-level Introduction to
Psychology course. Using a vignette empirical paradigm, participants will read
diagnostic vignettes extracted from DSM-IV Casebook (1994). Moreover, the
vignette content will be edited for comorbid disorder, such as drug dependence
and psychotic symptoms. After reading each diagnostic vignette, participants will
report their beliefs on dimensions of essentialism, global functioning, and
treatment associated with mental disorder. In addition, the participants will report
their beliefs on the historical Nature versus Nurture controversy, which will
indicate the degree to which participants intuitively adhere to a biomedical or
psychosocial model of mental disorders. Unlike the essentialism study by Haslam
and Ernst (2005), the present study will not experimentally manipulate beliefs and
intuitions about mental disorders.
The present study hypothesizes that lay conceptions of mental disorders
will form two broad groupings: mental disorders that are viewed as biologicallyoriented and categorical in nature and those that are influenced by psychosocial
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factors and are dimensional in nature. Specifically, we hypothesize that laypeople
with conceptualize Bipolar I Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Paranoid
Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder as cluster of mental
disorders, since these mental disorders have empirical support for a biological
basis. Also, we hypothesize that laypeople will conceptualize Alcohol
Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, Dysthymic Disorder, and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder as a different cluster of mental disorders, since these mental disorders
have empirical support for being influenced by psychosocial factors. Moreover,
we hypothesize that laypeople will believe that clusters of mental disorders share
similar latent qualities (i.e., Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability,
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification) and
similar global functioning. In addition, we hypothesize that laypeople who adhere
to a biomedical model, psychosocial model, or biomedical-psychosocial dialectic
model of mental disorders will conceptualize clusters of mental disorders
differently, since their attribution model of mental disorders will frame their
beliefs and intuitions about the clusters of mental disorders.
Method
Participants
Total participants were 400 undergraduates enrolled in psychology
introductory courses at the College of William and Mary. Since 6 participants
withdrew from the study, data was collected from 394 participants (245 females
and 149 males), who received course credit for research participation.
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Participants consisted of 242 freshmen (age M = 18.26, SD = 1.41), 97
sophomores (age M = 19.29, SD = 2.77), 28 juniors (age M —20.50, SD = 1.77),
and 27 seniors (age M —21.41, SD = 3.98). In addition, participants ethnically
self-identified as African American (7.4 %), Asian (7.1 %), Biracial (3.6 %),
Caucasian (75.1 %), Hispanic (3.6 %), Native American (.3 %), or Other (3 %).
For most participants (94.9 %), formal course work in psychology was
limited to introductory classes. Yet, some participants had completed 2
psychology courses (4.3 %) and 3 or more psychology courses (.8 %).
Participants’ academic majors included Undecided (22.6%), Psychology (7.6 %),
Hard Sciences/Neuroscience (24.1 %), Other Social Sciences (10.9 %),
Humanities (20.8 %), Education (2 %), and Business (11.9 %). 258 participants
intended to double major, which is a common decision at the College o f William
and Mary. Double majors included Psychology (7.4 %), Hard
Sciences/Neuroscience (14.5 %), Other Social Sciences

(9.9 %), Humanities

(24.4 %), Education (2.5 %), and Business (6.9 %).
Moreover, the degree of personal exposure to mental disorders varied
among participants, (19.3 % None, 25.9 % Minimal, 20.1 % Somewhat, 15.2 %
Fair Amount, and 19.5 % A lot). Participants reported personally knowing
someone diagnosed with the following mental disorders: Diagnosis Unknown
(5.36 %), Depression (17.6 %), Anxiety (2.79 %), Bipolar Disorder (16.52 %),
Schizophrenia (4.51 %), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (5.58 %), Eating
Disorder (1.72 %), Attention Deficit Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactive
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Disorder (3.43 %), Alcoholism (.43 %), Borderline Personality Disorder (.21 %),
Narcissism (.43 %), Autism (5.58 %), Learning Disorder (.86 %), Mental
Retardation (11.16 %), Alzheimer’s/Dementia (3.0 %), Tourette’s (1.07 %),
Insanity (.64 %), Biological Disease (e.g., stroke or cancer, 1.72 %), and Reactive
Attachment Disorder (.21 %). 57 participants (14.5 %) listed multiple mental
disorder diagnoses.
Materials
Mental Disorder Diagnostic Vignettes. Eight diagnostic vignettes
illustrating mental disorders were extracted from the DSM-IV Casebook (1994).
Content was edited for comorbid disorder, such as drug dependence and psychotic
symptoms. The researchers revised the following diagnostic vignettes:
Thunderbird for Alcohol Dependence (see Appendix A), Sixty-seven Pound
Weakling for Anorexia Nervosa (see Appendix B), Roller Coaster for Bipolar I
Disorder (see Appendix C), Junior Executive for Dysthymic Disorder (see
Appendix D), Foster Mother for Major Depressive Disorder (see Appendix E),
Under Surveillance for Paranoid Schizophrenia (see Appendix F), Flashbacks for
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (see Appendix G), and Wash Before Wearing for
Schizotypal Personality Disorder (see Appendix H). Since diagnostic vignettes
originated from the DSM-IV Casebook (1994), all mental disorders were
presented in a manner consistent with traditional psychiatric diagnostic
procedures and context. Each diagnostic vignette described the respective mental
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disorder symptomology and concluded with the psychiatrist diagnosing the
mental disorder.
Nature vs. Nurture Debate. A prompt overviewed the classic nature vs.
nurture psychology debate (see Appendix I). To maintain an untendentious
stance, the debate overview only acknowledged that some psychological
professionals attribute mental disorders to genetic factors, whereas other
psychological professionals attribute mental disorders to environmental factors.
Measures
Genetic Attribution. “This disorder is most likely primarily caused by a
genetic, neurochemical, or brain-based dysfunction.” This item was assessed by a
5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree,
5 = Strongly Agree).
Informativeness. “This disorder is an informative diagnostic category.
Knowing that someone has this disorder tells us a lot about the person.” This item
was assessed by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 =
Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Mutability. “This disorder can be cured.” This item was assessed by a 5point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5
= Strongly Agree).
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment. “This disorder can be effectively
treated with psychopharmaceuticals (i.e., meds).” This item was assessed by a 5-
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point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 2 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5
= Strongly Agree).
Psychosocial Attribution. “This disorder probably is the result of the
combination of stress and life experiences.” This item was assessed by a 5-point
Likert scale (7 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 =
Strongly Agree).
Reification. “This disorder refers to a social construct rather than an
objective bodily disorder.” This item was assessed by a 5-point Likert scale (7 =
Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Global Assessment o f Functioning Scale (GAF). The GAF scale (see
Appendix J; DSM-IV-TR, 2000) quantifies the quality of one’s occupational and
relational pursuits according to a numerical continuum of 100 (optimal mental
health) to 0 (severely mental illness). The GAF Scale satisfies Axis V, or Global
Functioning, o f the Multiaxial Assessment of mental disorders, and it is used by
all diagnosticians.
Nature Argument. The nature argument strongly endorses the biomedical
model of mental disorders (see Appendix K). It argues that mental disorders are
caused by genetic factors, or one’s “nature.” This item was assessed by a 5-point
Likert scale (7 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 =
Strongly Agree).
Nurture Argument. The nurture argument strongly endorses the
psychosocial model of mental disorders (see Appendix L). It argues that mental
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disorders are caused by environmental factors, or one’s “nurture.” This item was
assessed by a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 =
Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree).
Procedure
Using Sona Systems, participants completed an anonymous, online
computer survey that explored their beliefs and conceptualizations about various
mental disorders. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire that
assessed their educational background in psychology, their anticipated academic
major, and their prior exposure to mental disorders.
Next, participants were presented with 8 mental disorder diagnostic
vignettes. Following each diagnostic vignette, participants responded to items
that assessed their individual understanding of each illustrated mental disorder
(i.e., Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification, and GAF). The online
computer survey research design allowed participants to be presented with all
diagnostic vignettes and their accompanying items in randomized order.
Finally, participants read an overview of the Nature vs. Nurture Debate.
Participants then responded to the degree to which they endorsed the Nature
Argument and the Nurture Argument, which were likewise presented in
randomized order.
Results
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
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Table 1 presents the descriptive analyses for the clinical vignette measures
(i.e., Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification, and GAF). Using these clinical
vignette measures, we performed a series o f exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to
generate a theory regarding the latent structure of lay classification of various
mental disorders (Henson & Roberts, 2006).
To evaluate the appropriateness of EFA with the data set, we considered
our sample size, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
measure of sampling adequacy. Firstly, Tabachnik and Fidell (1996) recommend
at least 300 cases for a data set to be suitable for factor analysis. With 394
participants, our sample size was suitable for EFA. Secondly, Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was used to check for variable independence in conjunction with EFA.
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was obtained for each clinical vignette measure:
Genetic Attribution (410.17,/? < .001), Informativeness (829.53,/? < .001),
Mutability (567.58,/? < .001), Psychopharmaceutical Treatment (480.54,/?
< .001), Psychosocial Attribution (380.95,/? < .001), Reification (501. 05,/?
< .001), and GAF (479.85,/? < .001). These values for Bartlett’s test of sphericity
suggest that the variables are independent and are, therefore, suitable for EFA.
Finally, we obtained the KMO measure of sampling adequacy to indicate the
proportion of common variance in the measured variables. As a general rule of
thumb, KMO values over .60 are considered appropriate for EFA. The KMO
value obtained for each clinical vignette measure suggested were Genetic
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Attribution (.767), Informativeness (.853), Mutability (.793),
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment (.762), Psychosocial Attribution (.731),
Reification (.794), and GAF (.838). Based on the sample size, Bartlett’s test of
sphericity, and KMO measure of sampling adequacy, we determined that the data
set was, indeed, appropriate for EFA.
We proceeded to separately test each clinical vignette measure across all
mental disorders using a series of principal components analyses with direct
oblimin rotation. We used an oblique rotation, because it more accurately reflects
real-world phenomena, which are often correlated. For all EFA analyses, factors
were extracted according to the Kaiser criterion that eigenvalues be at least 1.00
(Kaiser, 1960). Moreover, for a mental disorder to be retained for a factor, its
factor loading on the structure matrix exceeded .40 and its loadings demonstrated
a similar trend on the pattern matrix.
Genetic Attribution. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 2). The first
factor had an eigenvalue of 2.513, and it explained 31.4% o f the variance. The
second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.335, and it explained 16.7% of the variance.
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder
loaded on the first factor, whereas, Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor. Dysthymic Disorder
and Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
Informativeness. The EFA only defined a single factor, which terminated
further analysis.
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Mutability. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 3). The first factor
had an eigenvalue of 2.931, and it explained 36.6% of the variance. The second
factor had an eigenvalue of 1.107, and it explained 13.8% of the variance.
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and
Schizotypal Personality Disorder loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence
and Anorexia Nervosa loaded on the second factor. Again, Dysthymic Disorder
and Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
Psychopharmaceutical Treatment. The EFA defined two factors (see
Table 4). The first factor had an eigenvalue of 2.585, and it explained 32.3% of
the variance. The second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.456, and it explained
18.2% of the variance. Bipolar I Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, Major
Depressive Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality
Disorder loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor.
Psychosocial Attribution. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 5).
The first factor had an eigenvalue of 2.372, and it explained 29.6% of the variance.
The second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.400, and it explained 17.5% of the
variance. Bipolar I Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and
Schizotypal Personality Disorder loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence,
Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor.
Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
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Reification. The EFA defined two factors (see Table 6). The first factor
had an eigenvalue of 2.771, and it explained 34.6% of the variance. The second
factor had an eigenvalue of 1.221, and it explained 15.3% of the variance.
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder
loaded on the first factor. Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder loaded on the second factor. Dysthymic Disorder
and Major Depressive Disorder loaded on both factors.
GAF. The EFA only defined a single factor, which terminated further
analysis.
EFA Series Analyses Interpretation. Using visual qualitative inspection of
the pattern and structure matrices for the EFA series analyses, we determined that
the laypeople do not classify various mental disorders as conceptually distinct.
The EFA analyses series suggest that laypeople intuitively cluster mental
disorders according to their latent qualities. The mental disorders Bipolar I
Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder were
consistently clustered on the first factor. Since research suggests that Bipolar I
Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder have a
strong genetic component, the first factor could be defined as genetic factors.
Hence, Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality
Disorder could be clustered as Genetic Disorders.
Conversely, Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder consistently loaded on the second factor. Since research suggests
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that Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
are strongly influenced by one’s environment, the second factor could be defined
as environmental factors. Hence, Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder could be clustered as Psychosocial Disorders.
Interestingly, Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder tended
to load on both factors. This pattern suggests that laypeople conceptualize
Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder as being influenced by both
genetic and environmental factors. The consistent straddling of the genetic and
environmental factors suggests that Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive
Disorder are a distinct mental disorder cluster, which could be categorized as
Depressive Disorders.
Figure 1 depicts the clustering of mental disorders according to factor
loadings on genetic and environmental factors from the EFA series analyses.
Confirmatory Mental Disorder Clustering MANOVA
To confirm the clustering of mental disorders according to EFA were
conceptually distinct, a 3 (Mental Disorder Cluster: Genetic, Depressive, and
Psychosocial Disorders) X 7 (Clinical Vignette Measures: Genetic Attribution,
Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical Treatment, Psychosocial
Attribution, Reification, and GAF) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
with repeated measures was performed. The MANOVA revealed a significant
overall effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental
disorders, Wilks’ A = .326, F ( 14, 2346) = 126.05, p < .001. In addition,
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univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects
between mental disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table
7).
Since the purpose of the MANOVA was to confirm the clustering of
mental disorders into Genetic, Depressive, and Psychosocial Disorders, we used
Tukey’s HSD homogenous subsets post-hoc test, which significantly described
the data (p < .05). Except for Informativeness, each clinical vignette measure
grouped into a significantly distinct homogenous subsets which orthogonally
corresponded with the mental disorder clusters of Genetic, Depressive, and
Psychosocial Disorders from the EFA (see Table 8). For Informativeness,
Genetic Disorders (M= 3.41, SD = .78) grouped into one subset, Depressive
Disorders (M = 3.23, SD = .77) grouped into the other subset, and Psychosocial
Disorders (M = 3.32, SD = .75) grouped into both subsets, suggesting that
Informativeness may not be an important criterion for mental disorders with
laypeople.
The results of Tukey’s HSD homogenous subsets post-hoc analysis
confirm that laypeople group Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and
Schizotypal Personality Disorder into a one classification, which could be labeled
Genetic Disorders; Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder into another classification, which could be labeled Psychosocial
Disorders, and Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder into a third
classification, which could be labeled Depressive Disorders. Theses findings
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suggest that relative to other mental disorders, laypeople tend to classify and
conceptualize the mental disorders within a cluster in a similar manner.
Attribution Model o f Mental Disorders
To test our final hypothesis, we examined the interaction between a
layperson’s attribution model of mental disorders and his or her beliefs regarding
the mental disorders within each clustering.
Attribution Model Profiles. Using a 5-point Likert scale, participants
responded to the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the Nature
Argument and the Nurture Argument. From combined responses to the Nature
and Nurture Arguments, we created profile for each participant to reflect his or
her world view on the attribution of mental disorders. For the Biomedical Profile
(N = 110), participants responded Nature > 4 and Nurture < 2. The Biomedical
Profile characterizes strong support for biological explanations of mental
disorders and relatively low support for psychosocial explanations. For the
Moderate Profile (N= 210), participants responded Nature = 3 | 4 and Nurture =
3 | 4. The Moderate Profile incorporates the interaction of gene expression within
one’s environment into one’s attribution model of mental disorders. For the
Psychosocial Profile (N= 15), participants responded Nature < 2 and Nurture > 4.
The Psychosocial Profile is characterized by strong support for psychosocial
explanations of mental disorders and relatively low support for biological
explanations. For the Mixed Predictor Profile (N = 59), participants did not
satisfy the criteria for the Biomedical, Moderate, and Psychosocial Profiles.
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Participants in the Mixed Predictor Profile either had converging, polarized
responses, or they had one moderate response and one extreme response. Hence,
inferences on the attribution model of mental disorders for participants with a
Mixed Predictor Profile could not be made.
Analytic Strategy. A series of 4 (Attribution Model Profile: Biomedical,
Moderate, Psychosocial, and Mixed Predictor) X 7 (Clinical Vignette Measures:
Genetic Attribution, Informativeness, Mutability, Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment, Psychosocial Attribution, Reification, and GAF) multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures were performed for each mental
disorder cluster. A significant interaction was followed by Tukey’s HSD post-hoc
test for multiple comparisons to locate the effect.
Genetic Disorders Cluster. The MANOVA revealed a significant overall
effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental disorders,
Wilks’A = .013, F (7, 384) = 4166.56,/? < .001. In addition, univariate analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects between mental
disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 9).
These main effects were located using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test for
multiple comparisons. For Genetic Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was
significantly different from the Moderate (.29,/? < .001), Psychosocial (.52,/?
< .01), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (.28,/? < .01). For Mutability, the
Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate (-.22,/? < .05)
and Psychosocial (-.51 ,P < .05) Profiles. For Psychosocial Attribution, the
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Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate (-.48, p < .001),
Psychosocial (-.69, p < .01), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.57,/? < .001). For
Reification, the Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate
(-.38,/? < .001), Psychosocial (-.77,/? < .001), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.32,
p < .05). For GAF, the Psychosocial Profile was significantly different from the
Biomedical (9.04,/? < .05) and Mixed Predictor Profiles (8.15,/? < .05).
Depressive Disorders Cluster. The MANOVA revealed a significant
overall effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental
disorders, Wilks’A = .015, F (7, 384) = 3608.70,/? < .001. In addition, univariate
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects between
mental disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 10).
These main effects were located using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test for
multiple comparisons. For Genetic Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was
significantly different from the Moderate (.34,/? < .001), Psychosocial (1.06,/?
< .001), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (.58,/? < .001). For Informativeness, the
Biomedical Profile is significantly different from the Psychosocial (-.65,/? < .05)
and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.36,/? < .05). For Mutability, the Psychosocial
Profile was significantly different from the Biomedical (.75,/? < .01) and the
Moderate Profiles (.58,/? < .05). For Psychopharmaceutical Treatment, the
Psychosocial Profile was significantly different from the Biomedical (-.75,/?
< .001), Moderate (-.66,/? < .01), and the Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.59,/? < .05).
For Psychosocial Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was significantly different
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from the Moderate (-.26, p < .01) and Psychosocial Profiles (-.52,/? < .05). For
Reification, the Biomedical Profile was significantly different from the Moderate
(-.40,/? < .001), Psychosocial (-.67,/? < .01), and Mixed Predictor Profiles (-.50,/?
< .001). For GAF, the Psychosocial Profile was significantly different from the
Biomedical Profile (8.05,/? < .05).
Psychosocial Disorders Cluster. The MANOVA revealed a significant
overall effect between mental disorder clustering and lay beliefs about mental
disorders, Wilks’A = .011, F (7, 384) = 4911.18,/? < .001. In addition, univariate
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated significant main effects between
mental disorder clustering and each clinical vignette measure (see Table 11).
These main effects were located using Tukey’s HSD post-hoc test for
multiple comparisons. For Genetic Attribution, the Biomedical Profile was
significantly different from the Psychosocial Profile (.53,/? < .05). For
Informativeness, the Biomedical Profile is significantly different from the
Moderate (-.31 ,P < .01), Psychosocial (-.58,/? < .05), and Mixed Predictor
Profiles (-.34,/? < .05). For Mutability, the Psychosocial Profile was significantly
different from the Biomedical Profile (.62,/? < .01). For Psychosocial Attribution,
the Mixed Predictor Profile was significantly different from the Biomedical (.27,
/? < .01) and Moderate Profiles (.22,/? < .01).
Discussion
The findings partially supported the hypothesis that laypeople cluster
mental disorders into two broad groupings: one cluster of mental disorders that
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are biologically-oriented and categorical in nature and the other cluster of mental
disorders are influenced by psychosocial factors and are dimensional in nature. In
actuality, the results indicated that laypeople conceptualize mental disorders into
three broad clusters. The first cluster of mental disorders, which included Bipolar
I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder, were
labeled Genetic Disorders, since these mental disorders have a strong biological,
brain-based component. Laypeople believed the Genetic Disorders cluster shared
latent qualities, according to the dimensions of genetic attribution, mutability,
psychopharmaceutical treatment, psychosocial attribution, and reification. The
second cluster of mental disorders, which included Alcohol Dependence,
Anorexia Nervosa, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, were labeled as
Psychosocial Disorders, since these mental disorders are likely to be strongly
influenced by psychosocial factors, such as life stressors. Laypeople believed that
the Psychosocial Disorders cluster shared similar latent qualities, according to the
dimensions of genetic attribution, psychopharmaceutical treatment, psychosocial
attribution, and reification. For the dimension of mutability, only Alcohol
Dependence and Anorexia Nervosa were viewed similarly. The third cluster of
mental disorders, which included Dysthymic Disorder and Major Depressive
Disorder, was labeled Depressive Disorders. Laypeople conceptualize the
Depressive Disorders cluster as being influenced by both genetic and
environmental clusters. As a result, the Depressive Disorders cluster shares some
latent qualities with the Genetic Disorders and other latent qualities with the
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Psychosocial Disorders. Firstly, laypeople believed the Depressive Disorders
shared genetic attribution, mutability, and reification with both the Genetic
Disorders and the Psychosocial Disorders. Secondly, laypeople believed the
Depressive Disorders shared psychopharmaceutical treatment with the Genetic
Disorders. Thirdly, laypeople believed that Dysthymic Disorder shared
psychosocial attribution with the Genetic Disorders, whereas Major Depressive
Disorder shared psychosocial attribution with both the Genetic Disorders and
Psychosocial Disorders
Our second set of hypotheses regarding the influence of intuitive
attribution models on beliefs about mental disorders was also partially supported.
For the Genetic Disorders cluster of mental disorders, laypeople who ascribe to a
biomedical model conceptualized the latent qualities of genetic attribution,
mutability, psychosocial attribution, reification, and GAF from laypeople who
espouse a psychosocial model or dialectic model. For the Depressive Disorders
cluster of mental disorders, laypeople with a biomedical model conceptualized the
latent qualities genetic attribution, informativeness, mutability,
psychopharmaceutical treatment, psychosocial attribution, reification, and GAF
differently that laypeople with a psychosocial model of mental disorders.
Laypeople with a dialectic model of mental disorders sided with those with a
biomedical model for mutability and psychopharmaceutical treatment, whereas
they sided with those with a psychosocial model for genetic attribution,
psychosocial attribution, and reification. For the Psychosocial Disorders cluster
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of mental disorders, laypeople with a biomedical model conceptualized the latent
qualities genetic attribution, informativeness, mutability, and psychosocial
attribution differently than laypeople with a psychosocial model. Laypeople with
a dialectic model of mental disorders sided with those with a biomedical model
for the psychosocial attribution, whereas they sided with those with a
psychosocial model for informativeness.
Cumulatively, the results suggest that laypeople do not conceptualize each
mental disorder as a distinct category. In fact, the findings indicate that laypeople
cluster mental disorders into three broad groupings, with each cluster sharing
common properties along a continuum of genetic and environmental influences.
Specifically, laypeople cluster Alcohol Dependence, Anorexia Nervosa, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, because they view these mental disorders as
largely the result o f psychosocial factors. On the other hand, laypeople cluster
Bipolar I Disorder, Paranoid Schizophrenia, and Schizotypal Personality Disorder,
because these disorders are influenced by genetic factors. Laypeople cluster
Major Depressive Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder, because they apparently
view these mental disorders as influenced by both genetic and environmental
factors.
Interestingly, laypeople’s beliefs about mental disorders were
contextualized by their own intuitive attribution model for mental disorders. In
general, laypeople with a biomedical model viewed Genetic Disorders and
Psychosocial Disorders differently that laypeople with a psychosocial model or
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biomedical-psychosocial model. For the Depressive Disorders, there was more
variance in how laypeople conceptualized mental disorders. Although laypeople
with a biomedical model differed from those with a psychosocial model,
laypeople with a dialectic biomedical-psychosocial model held varying beliefs.
Firstly, the results suggest that laypeople do not conceptualize mental
disorders according the a “pure” biomedical model. According to Haslam (2000),
the biomedical model asserts that each mental disorder has a specific, brain-based
etiology and mental disorders are real, categorically distinct entities which can be
diagnosed. Yet, laypeople differentially conceptualized mental disorders
according to broad groupings, not discrete categories. In addition, laypeople
believed some disorders (i.e., the Genetic Disorders cluster) had a biologicallyoriented, brain based etiology, other disorders (i.e., the Psychosocial Disorders
cluster) had a psychosocial etiology, and still other disorders (i.e., the Depressive
Disorders cluster) had a dualistic etiology stemming from both genetic and
environmental factors. This suggests that regardless of one’s intuitive causal
model, laypeople categorize mental disorders into broad clusters. Secondly,
laypeople conceptualize discrete clusters of mental disorders along a dimensional
continuum of mental disorder etiology. This finding might explain why extant
research on lay beliefs about mental disorders report laypeople categorize mental
disorders as either biomedical or psychosocial in nature (for review, see
Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). After all, most studies on lay beliefs about
mental disorders only investigate schizophrenia and depression. Since only two
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mental disorders are examined, researchers can only detect a bifurcated
perspective, not a continuum. Thirdly, the results of the present study indicate
that lay biases and preconceived notions on the causal attribution of mental
disorders does contextualize one’s conceptions of mental disorders.
These findings have several implications. For one, they raise important
questions about the current diagnostic system and the prevalence of the neoKraepelin biomedical model of mental disorders. After all, the results indicated
that laypeople do not conceptualize and categorize mental disorders in manner
consistent with the DSM-IV-TR. Specifically, laypeople do not view each mental
disorder as a unique entity. This may suggest that some mental disorders, such a
Paranoid Schizophrenia and Bipolar I Disorder, are conceptualized as “true”
mental disorders by laypeople, whereas other mental disorders, such as Alcohol
Dependence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, are conceptualized as common
problems of living. Hence, the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic classification of mental
disorders and the biomedical model may be appropriate for some mental disorders,
but not others. Secondly, the findings of the present study could have interesting
implications for the stigma of mental disorders. Historically, individuals with
mental disorders have been stigmatized and deligitimized by society (Alexander
& Selesnick, 1995; Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000). A biomedical model for
understanding the Genetic Disorders cluster could minimize stigma. After all, the
biomedical explanation of mental disorders could alleviate personal responsibility
from having a mental disorder. On the other hand, there is the possibility that a
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biomedical explanation of mental disorders could augment stigmatization, since
essentialist beliefs are associated with prejudice (e.g., Haslam & Levy, 2006).
The present study had several empirical limitations. For one, the study
used a college sample of undergraduates who are currently enrolled in an
Introductory Psychology course. The curriculum of the Psychology department
requires that students take an introduction to psychology as a social science and
an introduction to psychology as a natural science. Hence, the sample may be
familiar with the biomedical and psychosocial models of mental disorders, despite
the fact that they have no formal training in psychopathology. For this reason, the
present sample may not be representative o f other college samples in which the
participants are enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course.
The second limitation of the study was the vignette empirical paradigm.
Since one of the implications of lay conceptions of mental disorders is
stigmatization, then it is important to understand how laypeople conceptualize
mental disorders in a real-world context. The current study used diagnostic
vignettes. However, laypeople will realistically encounter mental disorders
through the media and personal experience. Hence, it may be advantageous to
use a video paradigm in which participants could view clips of individuals with
mental disorders. A third limitation of the study is the statistical analyses. The
most appropriate statistical test to investigate lay conceptions of mental disorders
is a hierarchical factor analysis. During a hierarchical factor analysis, an
exploratory factor analysis is followed by a confirmatory factor analysis. This, in
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effect, generates a theoretical model, and it then tests that model. However, the
statistical software available would not accommodate this statistical procedure.
The present study suggests several directions for future research. For one,
it is important for future studies to investigate lay conceptions of mental disorders
among the general population, psychological researchers, and other mental health
care professionals. This work could have important implications for the structure
of the psychological and psychiatric professions. Specifically, it might provide
much needed guidance and consensus for the classification of mental disorders.
In addition, future research should consider more realistic paradigms. In order to
examine the interaction between conceptions of mental disorders and the stigma
of mental disorders, it is important to investigate lay perceptions of mental
disorders in realistic contexts.
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Appendix A
Alcohol Dependence Vignette
A 43-year-old divorced carpenter is examined in the hospital emergency room
because for the last few days he has been confused and unable to take care of
himself. The patient's sister is available to provide some information. The sister
reports that the patient has consumed large quantities of cheap wine daily for over
5 years. He had a reasonably stable home life and job record until his wife left
him for another man 5 years previously. The sister indicates that the patient drinks
more than a fifth of wine a day, and that this has been an unvarying pattern since
the divorce. He often has blackouts from drinking and has missed work;
consequently, he has been fired from several jobs. Fortunately for him, carpenters
are in great demand, and he has been able to provide marginally for himself
during those years. However, 3 days ago he ran out of money and wine and had to
beg on the street to buy a meal. The patient has been poorly nourished, eating
perhaps one meal a day and evidently relying on the wine as his prime source of
nourishment. The psychiatrist diagnosed the carpenter with Alcohol Dependence.
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Appendix B
Anorexia Nervosa
When Peggy was first evaluated for admission to an inpatient eating disorder
program, she was a 20-year-old woman who had difficulty supporting her 5’3”
body with a weight of only 67 pounds. She had begun to lose weight 4 years
earlier, initially dieting to lose and unwanted 6 pounds. Encouraged by
complements on her new body, she proceeded to lose 8 more pounds. Over the
next 2 years she continued to lose weight, increased her physical activity, and
stopped menstruating. When Peggy went off to college, where, with increased
academic and social demands, she dieted until she weighed 67 pounds. Her
eating habits were ritualized: she cut food into very small pieces, moved them
around on the plate, and ate very slowly. She resisted eating foods with high fat
and carbohydrate content. She was troubled by the changes in her body, and
became increasingly anxious as her figure developed. Peggy was forced to drop
out of school and to accept a hospitalization, where a psychiatrist diagnosed her
with Anorexia Nervosa.
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Appendix C
Bipolar I Disorder
The troubles of Ernest Eaton, age 37, began 7 years before when he was working
as an insurance adjuster. Mr. Eaton began experiencing dramatic mood changes.
This pattern of alternating periods of elation and depression, apparently with few
“normal” days, repeated itself continuously over the following years. During his
energetic periods, Mr. Eaton was optimistic and self-confident, but short tempered
and easily irritated. His judgment at work was erratic. He spent large sums of
money on unnecessary and, for him, uncharacteristic purchases, such as a highpriced stereo system and several Doberman pinschers. He also had several
impulsive sex flings. During his depressive periods, he often stayed in bed all day
because of fatigue, lack o f motivation, and depressed mood. He stopped eating,
bathing, and shaving. After several days of this withdrawal, Mr. Eaton would rise
from bed one morning feeling better and, within 2 days, be back at work, often
feverishly, though ineffectively, to catch up on work he had let slide during his
depressed periods. The psychiatrist diagnosed Mr. Eaton with Bipolar I Disorder.
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Appendix D
Dysthymic Disorder
A 28-year-old junior executive was referred by a senior psychoanalyst for
“supportive” treatment. She had obtained a master’s degree in business
administration and moved to California 1.5 years earlier to begin work at a large
firm. She complained of being “depressed” about everything: her job, her
husband, and her prospects for the future. She claims that she’s had persistent
feelings of depressed mood, inferiority, and pessimism since the age of 16 or 17.
Although she did reasonably well in college, she consistently ruminated about
those students who were “genuinely intelligent.” She dated during college and
graduate school, but claimed that she never went after a guy she thought was
“special,” always feeling inferior and intimidated. Just after graduation, she
married the man she was going out with at the time. She thought o f him as
reasonably desirable, though not “special,” and married him primarily because she
felt she needed a husband for companionship. Recently she has also been having
difficulties at work. She is assigned the most menial tasks at the firm and is never
given an assignment of importance or responsibility. The psychiatrist diagnosed
the junior executive with Dysthymic Disorder.
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Appendix E
Major Depressive Disorder
Cheryl Jones is a 44-year-old mother of 3 teenagers and a foster mother. One
year previously, after an argument with her lover, she became acutely distraught.
Over a 3-week period she stayed in her apartment, had new locks put on the doors,
kept the shades down, and avoided everyone but her immediate family. Even
once she began to feel “back to normal,” she seemed to lose her energy and
motivation to do anything. She became increasingly depressed, lost her appetite,
and woke at 4:00 a.m. or 5:00 a.m. every morning and was unable to get back to
sleep. She could no longer read a newspaper or watch TV because she couldn’t
concentrate. Ms. Jones’ condition has persisted for 9 months. She has done very
little except sit in her apartment, staring at the walls. Her children have managed
most of the cooking, shopping, bill paying, and so on. During Ms. Jones’
hospitalization for treatment, the psychiatrist diagnosed her with Major
Depressive Disorder.
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Appendix F
Paranoid Schizophrenia
Mr. Simpson is a 44-year-old, single, unemployed white man brought to the
emergency room by the police for striking an elderly woman in his apartment
building. His chief complaint is, “That damn bitch. She and the rest of them
deserved more than that for what they put me through.” The patient has been ill
since age 22. During his first year of law school, he gradually became more and
more convinced that his classmates were making fun of him. He noticed that they
would snort and sneeze whenever he entered the classroom. When a girl he was
dating broke off the relationship with him, he believed that she had been
“replaced” by a look-alike. He called the police and asked for their help to solve
the “kidnapping.” Today, Mr. Simpson maintains that his apartment is the center
of a large communication system that involves all three major television networks,
his neighbors, and apparently hundreds of “actors” in his neighborhood. There
are secret cameras in his apartment that carefully monitor all his activities. When
he is watching TV, many of his minor actions (e.g., going to the bathroom) are
soon directly commented on by the announcer. Whenever he goes outside, the
“actors” have all been warned to keep him under surveillance. Everyone on the
street watches him. His neighbors operate two different “machines;” one is
responsible for all of his voices, except the “joker.” He is not certain who
controls this voice, which visits him only occasionally and is very funny. The
other voices, which he hears many times each day, are generated by this machine,
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which he sometimes thinks is directly run by the elderly neighbor whom he
attacked. The psychiatrist diagnosed Mr. Simpson with Paranoid Schizophrenia.
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Appendix G
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
A 23-year-old Vietnam veteran was admitted to the hospital 1 year after the end
of the Vietnam War, at the request of his wife, when he began to experience
depression, insomnia, and “flashbacks” of his wartime experiences. He had been
honorably discharged, having spent nearly a year in combat. At about the time of
the fall of Saigon, he became preoccupied with watching TV news stories about
this event. He then began to have difficulty sleeping, and at times would awaken
at night in the midst o f a nightmare in which he was reliving his past war
experiences. His wife became particularly concerned one day when he had a
flashback while out in the backyard: as a plane flew overhead, flying somewhat
lower than usual, the patient threw himself to the ground, seeking cover, thinking
it was an attacking helicopter. The more he watched the news on TV, the more
agitated and morose he became. Stories began to spill out of him about horrifying
atrocities like those he had seen and experienced, and he began to feel guilty that
he had survived when many of his friends had not. At times he also seemed angry
and bitter, feeling that the sacrifices he and others made were all wasted. His
preoccupation with Vietnam had become so intense that he seemed uninterested
in anything else and emotionally distant from his wife. When she suggested that
they try to plan their future, including having a family, he responded as if his life
currently consisted completely of the world of events experienced during Vietnam,
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as if he had no future. The psychiatrist diagnosed the vet with Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder.
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Appendix H
Schizotypal Personality Disorder
A 41-year-old man was referred to a community health center’s activities program
for help in improving his social skills. He had a lifelong pattern of social isolation,
with no real friends, and spent long hours worrying that his angry thoughts about
his older brother would cause his brother harm. He had previously worked as a
clerk in civil service but had lost his job because of poor attendance and low
productivity. On interview the patient was distant and somewhat distrustful. He
described in elaborate and often irrelevant detail his rather uneventful and routine
daily life. For instance, he told the interviewer that he had spent and hour and a
half in a pet store deciding which of two brands o f fish food to buy and explained
their relative merits. He asked the interviewer whether, if he joined the program,
he would be required to participate in groups. He said that groups made him very
nervous because he felt that if he revealed too much personal information, such as
the amount of money that he had in the bank, people would take advantage of him
or manipulate him for their own benefit. The psychiatrist diagnosed this man with
Schizotypal Personality Disorder.
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Appendix I
Nature vs. Nurture Debate
The fields of psychology and psychiatry have been embroiled in controversy
about whether or not biological factors cause mental disorders. Some
psychologists and psychiatrists argue that most mental disorders are due to
biological factors such as genes, disturbances in brain chemistry, or hormonal
difficulties. Others argue that most mental disorders are due to non-biological
factors such as psychological conflicts, traumatic life experiences, or
dysfunctional family environments.
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Appendix J
Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF)
100 Superior functioning in a wide range of activities, life's problems never seem
to get out of hand, is sought out by others because of his or her many
positive qualities. No symptoms.
90

Absent or minimal symptoms, good functioning in all areas, interested and
involved in a wide range of activities, socially effective, generally satisfied
with life, no more than everyday problems or concerns.

80

If symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to
psychosocial stressors; no more than slight impairment in social,
occupational, or school functioning.

70

Some mild symptoms OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning, but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful
interpersonal relationships.

60 Moderate symptoms OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning.
50 Serious symptoms OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or
school functioning.
40 Some impairment in reality testing or communication OR major impairment
in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment,
thinking, or mood.
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30 Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR
serious impairment, in communication or judgment OR inability to
function in almost all areas.
20 Some danger of hurting self or others OR occasionally fails to maintain
minimal personal hygiene OR gross impairment in communication.
10 Persistent danger of severely hurting self or others OR persistent inability to
maintain minimal personal hygiene OR serious suicidal act with clear
expectation of death.
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Appendix K
Nature Argument
However, in the past few years striking evidence has mounted in favor of the
biological causation of mental disorders. For instances, genetic researchers have
demonstrated that genes play a role in making people vulnerable to most mental
disorders - e.g. mental disorders run strongly in families - and have located these
genes on certain chromosomes. In addition, new technologies such as MRI and
PET scans have allowed medical researchers to prove that people who suffer from
mental disorders have abnormal levels of neurochemicals in their brains and/or
structural abnormalities. These abnormalities disrupt the person's ability to
overcome life stresses, so that their emotions and behaviors can no longer be
controlled. Diagnostic categories can now be validated against these genetic and
brain-based findings so that it has been demonstrated unequivocally that
diagnostic categories are indicators of underlying brain-based disorders.
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Appendix L
Nurture Argument
Yet, many years of clinical study and research have convinced most psychologists
that mental disorders are largely the result of painful and difficult life experiences,
and that few if any of these disorders can be understood solely as genetic and
biological problems
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Table 2
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion fo r Genetic Attribution (N =
394)

Mental Disorder

Factor 1

Factor 2

h2

Alcohol Dependence

.188

.700

.491

Anorexia Nervosa

.207

.742

.551

Bipolar I Disorder

.775

.034

.623

Dysthymic Disorder

.488

.562

.451

Major Depressive Disorder

.585

.437

.439

Paranoid Schizophrenia

.719

.086

.523

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

-.003

.608

.392

Schizotypal Personality

.611

.205

.377

Eigenvalues

2.513

1.335

% of variance

31.4

16.7

Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor.
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
is .836. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 3
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion fo r Mutability (N = 394)
Mental Disorder

Factor 1

Factor 2

h2

Alcohol Dependence

.139

.793

.647

Anorexia Nervosa

.374

.772

.610

Bipolar I Disorder

.709

.250

.503

Dysthymic Disorder

.576

.491

.430

Major Depressive Disorder

.541

.571

.462

Paranoid Schizophrenia

.737

.023

.602

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

.434

.327

.225

Schizotypal Personality

.746

.305

.559

Eigenvalues

2.931

1.107

% of variance

36.6

13.8

Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor.
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
is .889. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 4
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion fo r Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment (N = 394)

Mental Disorder

Factor 1

Factor 2

h2

Alcohol Dependence

.003

.782

.635

Anorexia Nervosa

.146

.756

.572

Bipolar I Disorder

.719

.046

.526

Dysthymic Disorder

.661

.322

.477

Major Depressive Disorder

.720

.108

.520

Paranoid Schizophrenia

.631

.073

.401

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

.346

.640

.461

Schizotypal Personality

.668

.178

.449

Eigenvalues

2.585

1.456

% o f variance

32.3

18.2

Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor.
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
■y

is .822. h = communality coefficient.
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Table 5
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion fo r Psychosocial Attribution (N
= 394)

Mental Disorder

Factor 1

Factor 2

h2

Alcohol Dependence

.113

.769

.594

Anorexia Nervosa

.156

.587

.345

Bipolar I Disorder

.711

.150

.505

Dysthymic Disorder

.590

.258

.365

Major Depressive Disorder

.432

.617

.473

Paranoid Schizophrenia

.739

.053

.558

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

.051

.641

.419

Schizotypal Personality

.715

.137

.511

Eigenvalues

2.372

1.400

% of variance

29.6

17.5

Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor.
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
is .904. h2 = communality coefficient.
•

•
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Table 6
Structure Matrix Rotated to the Oblimin Criterion fo r Reification (N = 394)
Mental Disorder

Factor 1

Factor 2

h2

Alcohol Dependence

.078

.718

.537

Anorexia Nervosa

.218

.696

.484

Bipolar I Disorder

.762

.179

.584

Dysthymic Disorder

.532

.436

.366

Major Depressive Disorder

.612

.562

.530

Paranoid Schizophrenia

.711

.197

.506

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

.300

.680

.472

Schizotypal Personality

.711

.134

.514

Eigenvalues

2.771

1.221

% of variance

34.6

15.3

Note: Coefficients greater than .40 are bolded and retained for that factor.
Percentage variance is postrotation. The eigenvalue of the third, unretained factor
is .853. h2 = communality coefficient.
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Table 7
Analysis o f Variance fo r Main Effects between Mental Disorder Clusters and
each Clinical Vignette Measure
Measure

df

F

P

n2

Genetic Attribution

2

402.34

<.001

.41

Informativeness

2

5.11

.006

.01

Mutability

2

98.04

<.001

.14

Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment

2

291.95

<.001

.33

Psychosocial Attribution

2

428.15

<.001

.42

Reification

2

220.23

<.001

.27

GAF

2

125.81

<.001

.18
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Table 8
Tukey’s HSD Post-Hoc Homogenous Subsets fo r Mental Disorder Clusterings
and Clinical Vignette Measures
Genetic
Disorders

Depressive
Disorders

Psychosocial
Disorders

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Genetic Attribution

3.97

.57

3.32

.75

2.60

.71

Mutability

2.53

.63

3.03

.75

3.21

.72

Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment

3.52

.61

3.38

.74

2.46

.65

Psychosocial Attribution

3.04

.75

3.88

.63

4.34

.49

Reification

2.29

.69

2.91

.79

3.41

.78

GAF

41.80

10.90

54.34

10.29

44.54

13.55

66
Table 9
Analysis o f Variance fo r Main Effects between Attribution Model Profiles and
each Clinical Vignette Measure in the Genetic Disorders Cluster

Measure

df

F

P

n2

Genetic Attribution

3

8.52

<.001

.061

Informativeness

3

.90

.44

.007

Mutability

3

4.64

<.01

.034

Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment

3

2.30

<.01

.017

Psychosocial Attribution

3

14.05

<.001

.098

Reification

3

10.96

<.001

.030

GAF

3

3.96

<.001

.18
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Table 10
Analysis o f Variance fo r Main Effects between Attribution Model Profiles and
each Clinical Vignette Measure in the Depressive Disorders Cluster

Measure

df

F

P

rj2

Genetic Attribution

3

15.31

<.001

.105

Informativeness

3

5.11

.002

.038

Mutability

3

4.87

.002

.036

Psychopharmaceutical
Treatment

3

4.83

.003

.036

Psychosocial Attribution

3

5.98

<.001

.044

Reification

3

9.32

<.001

.067

GAF

3

3.51

.015

.026

68
Table 11
Analysis o f Variance fo r Main Effects between Attribution Model Profiles and
each Clinical Vignette Measure in the Psychosocial Disorders Cluster

Measure

df

F

P

v2

Genetic Attribution

3

2.96

.032

.022

Informativeness

3

5.98

.001

.044

Mutability

3

3.53

.015

.026

P sychopharmaceutical
Treatment

3

1.97

.118

.015

Psychosocial Attribution

3

4.41

.005

.033

Reification

3

.91

.434

.007

GAF

3

.88

.454

.007

Figure Caption
Figure 1. Exploratory factor analysis mental disorder clusterings.
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